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The Ombatse Crisis in Nigeria:
Background, Recent Developments and Possible Solutions

Abstract:
This paper focuses on the hegemonic politics between the Eggon and Hausa/Fulani ethnic
groups in Nasarawa, North-Central Nigeria, which eventually erupted into the Ombatse crisis
of May 2013- a precursor to the 2015 general elections. It addresses four research questions
seeking to unravel whether or not: (1a) the crisis truly reflects a spiritual revivalist agenda as
projected by the Ombatse promoters or merely espouses Eggon rejection of MuslimHausa/Fulani ethnic hegemony- mirroring broadly the identity, hegemonic and exclusionary
politics in the area cum the larger Nigerian society;(b) the Eggon-Hausa-Fulani feud has the
potential to exacerbate the sectarian strife in Nigeria’s northern region and therefore deepen
the polarization among Nigeria’s disparate social groups-thereby threaten the consolidation of
Nigeria’s young democracy; (2) there are any institutional safeguards in place to forestall the
promotion of discriminatory tendencies in the politics of the state;(3) there is the likelihood of
the tendencies in the Nasarawa politics nudging the state into violence after the 2015
elections; and (4) there are viable solutions available to address the potentially violate
situation. Methodologically, using both primary and secondary sources- interviews and works
of scholars, and media reports on the crisis, the study came up with the following findings:
(1) the Ombatse crisis is not a religious-puritanical cause, but fits into the themes of identity
conflict, hegemonic and exclusionary politics; (2)the election outcome still reflected the deep
divisions and polarization among Nigeria’s disparate social groups- projecting Nigeria yet as
a deeply-divided society; (3) contrary to the pre-election anxiety, there were no violence
during and after the elections-owing essentially to the moderating presence in Nigeria during
the 2015 election of the International Criminal Court (ICC), who threatened to prosecute
person(s) or group(s) that perpetrate violence in the course of the election; (4)Nasarawa
politics lacks any ‘institutional safeguards to prevent the emergence of conditions in which
divisions within the society gain a salient discriminatory dimension and eventually facilitate
the rise of violence as a means to realize group interest’. The study suggests six
recommendations that can promote the solution of the potentially violate situation;
importantly, evolving a well-defined power-sharing framework, which aims at rotating such
political offices among the ethnic groups for a better inter-group relations, implementing past
recommendations of commission of inquiries and having the presence of the ICC during
elections.

Key words: Ombatse, Nasarawa-Eggon, Hausa-Fulani, identity, exclusionary and
hegemonic politics, sectarian violence

Introduction
In the last two decades, following the end of 1967-1970 civil war, Nigeria has had to
grapple with one form of violence or the other –all defining the acute security challenge
increasingly confronting the country. Most of the violence are sectarian in character,
mirroring the deep divisions, among Nigeria’s over 450 ethno-linguistic groups. These rifts
generally arise on the one hand from rivalry and competition for the abundant but badlymanaged material resources, and on the other by the subsequent hegemonic tendencies
among the ethnic groups. In the North, it is epitomized by the Hausa-Fulani hegemony,
whether real or perceived and its resistance by the minority ethnic groups. Although
oftentimes localized- occurring in specific geographic locations, and constituting real threat
to the immediate environment, they however also reverberate beyond the local boundaries
thus generating enough concerns for the entire country. Most of these acts of the violence are
usually viewed with ethno-regional and religious lens. Oftentimes, ignoring their underlying
political and economic contexts, analyses focus on the façades of ethnicity, region and
religion, as factors that inspire parties to feud against one another. Over all, although the
violence remained local in context- between and among local ethnic, regional and religious
forces in Nigeria- they nevertheless have nation-wide implication for the democratization
process in post-colonial Nigeria. In recent times, external forces have teamed with local
elements to raise the scepter of violence and insecurity in Nigeria, namely the Boko Haram
insurgency. However, the Ombatse crisis of May 2013 adds up to the identity politics
manifesting in sectarian forms along religious, ethnic and regional lines, sometimes also
taking the form of indigene-settler rifts, all which continually shape the violence that define
Nigeria’s security challenges. In this crisis scores of lives were lost, on both sides -security
forces (30) - (BBC News, 9 May, 2013) and 21 Eggons, (www.informationng.com/2013/05)
when the government agents stormed Alakyo, an Eggon village to arrest the chief priest of
the Ombatse cult, BabaAlakyo. The cult group were allegedly embarked on forceful initiation
into its membership of adherents of other religions and ethnic groups (ibid). Although the
Ombatse cultists claimed it was on a spiritual renewal- to clean the Eggon society of sundry
mundane ills, in reality, the crisis had a political component- Eggon protestation of their
marginalization from the governorship of Nasarawa state since its creation in 1996. They
were determined to produce the governor for the state by 2015, hence the mantra
underpinning the revolt, Ombaste- ‘Our Time has Come’.
This paper addresses the following four research questions about this crisis: (1). Does
the crisis truly reflect a religious- puritanical mission or merely mirror the identity,
hegemonic and exclusionary politics in the area cum the larger Nigerian society; does the
Eggon- Hausa-Fulani feud have the potential to exacerbate the sectarian strife in Nigeria’s
northern region and therefore deepen the polarization among Nigeria’s disparate social
groups – thus threaten Nigeria’s efforts at consolidating her young democracy; (2) are there
any institutional safeguards in place to forestall the promotion of discriminatory tendencies in
the politics of the state; (3) is there the likelihood of the tendencies in the Nasarawa politics
nudging the state into violence after the 2015 elections; and (4) what viable solutions are
available to address the potentially violate situation? Indeed the first research question

becomes important as it can provide clues to similar scenarios in places as Taraba and Plateau
states where identity and hegemonic politics are as verdant.
Some Theoretical Explorations
The Ombatse revolt certainly does not approximate contemporary Islamism, and may
not likely do so. However, Ankie Hoogvelt’s explanation of the root of the current Islamic
resurgence across the world may yet provide useful insight on how identity, hegemony and
exclusionary politics can either acting solely, or combine to throw a society, especially
deeply divided ones, into tumult. Thus according to her, “Islamic resurgence is best
understood as a politics of identity in response to exclusion…” (Hoogvelt, 2001:199). Stefan
Wolff (2011 as cited in Omeje, 2012:9) has argued that the “processes of democratization,
especially in ethnically, linguistically, religiously, ideologically or otherwise diverse and
potentially divided societies, are environments prone to conflict escalation.” Democracy in
such society, he further contends, “requires a range of special institutional safeguards to
prevent the emergence of conditions in which divisions within the society gain a salient
discriminatory dimension and eventually facilitate the rise of violence as a means to realize
group interest,” (ibid: 10).
The point has also rightly been made that while identity politics manifest in various
concrete and abstract forms, its true significance however lies in its impacts on world events
on a spectrum ranging from conflict to cooperation (du Plessis, 2011: 20). Identity politics in
the developing world tends to manifest more on the dysfunctional and destabilizing conflict
spectrum than cooperation. Elements of negative identity, therefore, are loss, exclusion,
deprival, fear, insecurity as opposed to belonging, inclusion, sharing, safety, security that
characterize positive identity (ibid:21). The theme of exclusionary politics has indeed
continued to engage increasing scholarly attention in recent times, with regards to African
politics, obviously because it has proved the underlining factor in many a political crisis in
many places on the African continent. In their study of the Democratic Republic of Congo,
Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Kenya, Boas and Dunn (2013) observe, for instance that, whereas
in the past African politics tended towards inclusiveness, the exclusiveness characteristic of
contemporary African politics is a recent development. They explored the phenomenon of
"autochthony" - literally meaning "son of the soil": the politics of origin and belonging- the
claim of first/earlier arrivals to exclude more recent immigrants, and the violent conflicts it
has generated across Africa. But outside of the issue of land or resource scarcity, Boas and
Dunn blame the increasing phenomenon of autochthony on the failure of neo-patrimonial
system in Africa- the decreasing capacity of the African neo-patrimonial network to distribute
resources. In the April 2015 election in Burundi, fear of domination and exclusion by the
minority Tutsi ethnic group over majority ethnic Hutu insistence on holding to power after
completing constitutionally-prescribed two-term limit through President Pierre Nkurunziza
was the cause of the pre-election violence and a failed coup d’état. Exclusionary politics also
accounts for the political crisis and instability in the Central African Republic since 2012.
In the context of the value of violence to politics generally, the tendency by the
different social groups, especially in multi-ethnic societies, to use violence in different

historical circumstances for political ascendency has been vigorously explored (Alozieuwa,
2013). Empirical support of this theory, which derive from Alozieuwa’s work, include the
Hausa-Fulani appropriation of the Nigerian military to hold central power between 1966 and
1999, Yoruba use of the June 12, 1993 presidential election de-annulment violence to gain
the presidency in 1999 through 2007, and the Niger Delta militancy that culminated to the
ascendency of the minority ethnic Ijaw to Nigeria’s presidency, 2010- 2015. His work on the
Boko Haram insurgency as a revolt and violent quest for Nigeria’s central power by the
Kanuri minority ethnic group in Northern Nigeria also fits into this theoretical context
(Alozieuwa, 2012). In the 2007-2008 general elections in Kenya, the youth reacted to four
decades of political and social deprivation by successive governments through the use of
violence (Mang’eni, 2010).
The tendency to hegemonic and exclusionary politics or resistant politics through the
instrumentality of violence is however not value-free. It could be understood in the context of
polities where according to Turner (1980: 69) politics becomes “the struggle to dominate the
polity [and] … for gaining control of public resources and/or (making) an exclusive claim to
allocate state resources….” While for such tendencies, as Nigeria’s political economist Julius
Ihonvbere, (1989), has noted, one is not necessarily looking for economic motives behind all
individual or group actions or even looking for economic explanation of all social action, the
Marxian theory of the primacy of material condition behind human social actions remains
relevant in looking at the agitation by excluded groups. Exclusion from the political
leadership in such societies limits the ability of the elite corps of such groups to expand their
frontiers of primitive accumulation. However, the probable impact of the leadership by the
elite corps of such groups on the material well-being of their commoners remains at the realm
of conjecture.
A History of Conflict
Nasarawa: A Distant History
Much has been written in the literature about the insensitivity of European
imperialism in arbitrarily partitioning Africa without regards to the cultural differences of its
peoples. Martin Meredith (2005:1) for instance, rightly notes that while marking out the
boundaries of their new territories, European negotiators frequently resorted to drawing
straight lines on the map, taking little or no account of the myriad of traditional monarchies,
chiefdoms and other African societies that existed on the ground. Where the European
imperialism did not engage in arbitrary partitioning of African territories without regards to
cultural differences of the people, it enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups,
with no common history, language or religion. Thus, Nigeria, for example, contained as many
as over 250 ethno-linguistic groups. Kingdoms that had been historically antagonistic to one
another were lumped together into latent hostility (ibid).
North Central Nigeria, to which Nasarawa belongs, typifies Nigeria’s ethno-culturally
fragmented society. It not only reflects the colonialists’ penchant for lumping together for a
new social intercourse, disparate and oftentimes hitherto antagonistic social groups, but also

fits into the theory that Nigeria was formed not to bring about a nation state but rather to
“perpetually create a division between the various peoples, [and]set one group against the
other…” (cited in Badmus Isiaka Alani, 2003:80). Now comprising six states, namely Benue,
Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Plateau, and the federal capital territory, Abuja, it is
home to a host of disparate ethno-linguistic groups in Nigeria. Nasarawa state alone hosts
about 25 of these groups, one of which is the Eggon. The specific date of the arrival and
settlement at their present abode of some of the major ethnic groups in Nasarawa state such
as the Alagos, Mada, Gwandara, Koro, and the Eggon (Premium Times, online, May 22,
2013), have been projected to about between 1232 AD and 1951 AD. But without any
specific date, the Eggon claim to earlier arrival projects them as having arrived before any
other ethnic group with whom they now co-habit the area. Despite claims of peaceful and
harmonious co-existence among the ethnic groups in Nasarawa state, relations among the
ethno-linguistic groups in the North Central region have recently been characterized by
perennial communal and sectarian strife, especially the Plateau-Nasarawa-Benue-Kogi axis fostered both by hegemonic and resistance politics.
The Eggon sense of political marginalization transcends the contemporariness of the
current agitation however. But it can be located within the context of the Hausa-Fulani
hegemonic politics with Islam constituting the single most important factor in the hegemonic
drive. For emphasis, Nasarawa has always been governed by Muslims since creation.
Although governor Al-Makura who currently epitomizes Eggon frustration, is a Muslim, he is
Gwandara and not Hausa-Fulani. Yet there is a sense in which the Muslim domination of the
political leadership of Nasarawa state resonates with the Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemonic
charge. According to Ibrahim Waziri,
The Hausa and Fulani are two distinct ethnic groups. But when the term is used as
Hausa-Fulani in Nigerian context, it refers to a socio-cultural group defined by loyalty to
Islam as a religion and an ideology in broad sense. By a socio-cultural group, I mean people
who share a destiny in norms and values in the social, economic and political spaces.
Sometimes when this term is used it includes people who are neither ethnically Hausa nor
Fulani but share the same vision of life that makes for the Hausa-Fulani. This is why a person
like me even though being Kanuri ethnically will gladly pass for a Hausa-Fulani culturally
(http://kadunavoice.com)
The Eggon angst, therefore, fuses identity, exclusionary politics and religion. The fear
of the Hausa-Fulani cum Moslem hegemonic agenda, whether real or imaginary and even if
nourished by the fact of the state having not been governed by a non-Muslim/Eggon since
inception, is therefore a strong variable in the crisis (Chris Mamman: Interview, 10 October,
2013).

Nasarawa State: Present History
The Ombatse crisis in Alakyo village, Nasarawa state, contiguous to Abuja, in early
May 2013, gained national attention when a contingent of Nigeria’s security forces detailed

to arrest the high-priest of the Ombatse cult was ambushed by the group. There were loss of
lives including those of the security forces- 10 members of the secret police, the Department
of State Services, (DSS) and 20 members of the Mobil Police, (MOPOL) unit of the Nigerian
Police Force (NPF). Ombaste belongs to the Eggon ethnic nationality in Nasarawa, state. The
Ombatse cultists allegedly were forcefully initiating into their membership, adherents of other
religions. The group claimed it was on spiritual renewal mission- to clean the Eggon society
of sundry mundane ills (Joseph, 2013). But the crisis also espouses a political component.
The incident which was only symptomatic of the sectarian tension that had festered in the
area, especially between the Eggon and other groups, and fostered by ethno-religious
dichotomies, was all about Eggon protestation of their crisis of marginalization from the
governorship of Nasarawa state since its creation in 1996. Thus towards the 2015 general
elections, the Eggon were determined to produce the state governor. The crisis, therefore, was
specifically about the Eggon aspiration to the governorship of the state amidst the incumbent
state governor’s desire for a second term. By convention the security forces were on the
invitation of the governor.
After its creation, the first two military administrators (Milads) of Nasarawa state
(Abdullahi Ibrahim, October 1996-August 1998; Bala Mande, August 1998-May 1999 were
Moslems and non-indigenes in line with the prevailing military tradition at the time- not
posting military personnel to their states of origin as Milads. Thus the Eggon or any other
ethnic group in Nasarawa had no opportunity to preside over the affairs of the state from
October 1996 when the state was created under military dictatorship to May 1999 when the
military handed over power to civilian politicians. The state governors and their religion,
ethnic nationality and political constituency from 1999 to date are as follows:

Period

Governor

Ethnic Group

Religion

Senatorial Zone

1999-2007

Abdullahi
Adamu

Ahua

Moslem

South-West

2007-2011

Aliyu Akwe
Doma

Alago

Moslem

Nasarawa South

2011-Date

Tanko AlMakura

Gwandara

Moslem

Nasarawa South

Source: Author’s Table
Although the Eggon governorship aspiration had met with frustration since 1999, the
ethnic group was optimistic that 2015 was its appointed time- turn; they had prayed to their
local god, Azhili for a change in their political (mis)fortune in the state. According to Zachary
Zamani Allumag, an Eggon and retired magistrate, “[A]s 2015 is approaching, we are aware
that some people are planning to ensure the Eggon people are dislodged from the politics of

the state. So, they call us all kinds of names to hang us” (Sunday Sun, 2 June, 2013).Thus the
Eggon agitation is aptly encapsulated by the Ombatse mantra, ‘Our Time Has Come/This is
our Turn’ despite that the cult, according to Eggon legend is as old as the ethnic group itself.
The conflict, on the one hand was, therefore, about the struggle for political ascendency and
supremacy between the Eggon and the Hausa-Fulani in a culturally-defined sense and on the
other, Eggon resistance to Hausa-Fulani domination, according to Martha, an Eggon
(interview, 16 September, 2013)
Governor Al-Makura angst against the Ombatse cultists was allegedly due to earlier
clashes between the latter and mercenaries allegedly procured by the former and camped at
his Kwandere hometown. But crucial in understanding the distrust of the Eggon/Ombatse by
Al-Makura’s Gwandara ethnic group and other supporter forces in Nasarawa and proscription
of the Ombatse by the Al-Makura-led government is that the alleged forceful administration
of oath on non-Ombatse worshippers in the Nasarawa Eggon area between March 31, 2013
and April 7, 2013, was intended that in the 2015 elections, the Eggon would only vote for
Eggon candidates irrespective of party affiliations, (Sunday Sun, online, 2 June 2013). More
so, under the cover of spiritual revival, Ombatse recruitment drive targeted mainly the youth
who were given “native charms and/or amulets ‘that could ward off bullets,’” (Premium
Times, online, 22 May, 2013). Martha (interview, 16 September 2013) like any other Eggon,
as Zabura Musa Akwanshiki, Abdullahi Usman, Shuaibu Alkali, and Iliyasu Hassan Gyabo
and Hasuna Musa Zico Kigbu however, contests Ombatse characterization as an ethnic
militia or cult group (interview, 20 September 2013).
The Eggon claim the most- educated and enlightened of the ethnic groups in
Nasarawa (Martha interview). Against the backdrop of Ombatse’s Eggon minority ethnic
status, however, with the cult’s activities confined to Nasarawa geo-political space, alleged
forced oath-taking among its folks and Eggon concomitant desperation for political power
may all combine to project the group as a monster and so politically alienate the Eggon. In
the context of power struggle, among the ethnic groups in Nasarawa, therefore, for AlMakura, both Ombatse oath administration and Eggon agitation evoke the Mau Mau
Movement of the Kenyan Kikuyu ethnic group oath-taking ritual during the independent
struggles. The Mau Mau was characterized as “a sinister tribal cult affecting a largely
primitive and superstitious people, confused and bewildered by their contact with the
civilized world and prey to the malevolent designs of ambitious politicians,” (Meredith,
2006:79). Ombatse’s ‘This is our Time’ mantra, also draws a foreboding parallel to
Umkhonto we Sizwe, (Spear of the Nation), the organization used by Black South Africans in
the struggles against the Apartheid regime. Umkhonto we Sizwe had started its armed
struggle, with a warning that, ‘[T]he time comes in the life of any nation when there remains
only two choices: submit or fight. That time has now come’ (Ibid: 24-125). The Uniao das
Populacoes de Angola (UPA), which spear-headed the independence of Angola also started
out as a tribal organization by the Bakongo ethnic group to resurrect the old Kongo Kingdom,
before subsequently proclaiming nationalist objectives (ibid:135).
Although the Eggon have not expressed a separatist agenda either from Nigeria or
Nasarawa state, they are nevertheless driven by acute sense of political marginalization

(Mamman: interview).Their agitation thus is anchored more on a sense of exclusion, than on
indigene/settler rift, the latter which has been an important ingredient nourishing the festering
bloodletting between the ‘indigenous’ Christian ethnic groups in the Jos Plateau area and
their settler Muslim Hausa-Fulani rival. For other ethnic groups in Nasarawa however, the
counter charge of domineering tendencies against the Eggon and subsequent distrusted by
those other groups have not helped the Eggon political cause (interview (2013): Abdullahi
Liman, 21 September; Abdul Tukur, Rabo Bakare, and Asabe Musa: 12 October). Manshop
Peter Garba, a Kagoro from neighbouring Kaduna state, links the Eggon-phobia among other
ethnic groups in Nasarawa to the Eggon achievement in Western education and spread across
the nooks and crannies of the state; hence the deployment policy (interview: 18 September,
2013). The distrust ensures that during elections, other ethnic groups in Nasarawa combine
their respective populations to neutralize Eggon numerical strength (interview (2013): Hope
Eweka, 19 September; Nkiru Okoro, 12 October and Zakari Adamu, 20 September).

Methodology
This paper is based on descriptive survey in Abuja and Lafia, capital of Nasarawa
state, North-Central within the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Conducted in 2013, qualitative
information is obtained through personal, in-depth interviews and focus-group discussions,
constituting the primary sources of the study. The qualitative information from these sources
are gotten from seven Eggon and eight non-Eggon natives, providing both Eggon and nonEggon perspectives to the issue. The choice of non-Eggon minority persons is premised on
the assumption that as minorities themselves, more so, from the Middle Belt, their
perspective can be useful in understanding the politics of dominance and resistance in the
area in the general framework of majority- minority politics in Nigeria and the North
particularly. The interviewees are chosen based on their knowledge of the area and its politics
and they range from government functionaries, peace and conflict experts, community
association members, and ordinary folks (see their names and positions at the time in
Appendix A).
The open-ended approach was used for the questionnaire in order to allow for as
much information as possible. Some of the questions posed to the interviewees included:
(1).How true is the allegation that Ombatse is a cult and ethnic militia; is Ombatse really out
to sanitize society or is a political tool? (2). Why have the Eggon been unable to produce the
governor of the state despite their numerical strength? (3). Why have the other minority
ethnic groups in Nasarawa state failed to support their fellow minority, the Eggon, against the
majority Hausa-Fulani? (4). What do you think the tense politics of Nasawara state potent for
the Middle Belt in views its many disparate ethnic groups? (5) How do you think the problem
can be solved even within the larger Nigerian context? Indeed the notoriety of the HausaFulani hegemonic tendencies both in Nigeria and its North is well-documented in the
literature. Therefore, secondary sources are used on issues in reference to that subject in this
study. Other secondary sources include works of scholars, which were robustly x-rayed. The

study also made use of newspaper reports of the crisis because of the contemporariness of the
subject.
Empirical Findings
This section addresses the four research questions which the paper sought to
investigate from the outset.

Research question 1 – Ombatse crisis: Religious-puritanical agenda or
Identity/hegemonic politics
Conflicts in the Nasarawa area revolve around the themes of mutual suspicion and
fear of domination among the groups, discrimination/indigeneship/representation in
traditional institutions/competition for farming/grazing lands and unaddressed complaints.*1
Empirical findings on the crisis under investigation while fitting into these traditional
analytical frameworks, have no linkage whatsoever with any form of spiritual rejuvenation
contrary to Ombatse claims. The following instances might suffice: the confrontation
between the Eggon and the Gwandara ethnic group in Kwandere in February, 2013 during
which the palace of the governor Al-Makura’s elder brother was burnt down, was a fall-out of
the conflict between the Eggon and Fulani over farming and grazing issues; the deployment
policy adopted by the state government aimed at relocating the Eggon from their settlements
across the state back to Nasarawa Eggon and Akwanga areas, which was however challenged
up to the Nigerian Supreme Court, derived from the Eggon search for farmlands and
subsequent spread to other areas of the state outside of their ‘ancestral homestead’. That
search constantly pits them against other ethnic groups, including the Fulani, whose livestock
graze on the Eggon farms; the Fulani on their part allege cattle-rustling against the Eggon.
Baba Alakyo’s insistence that the Emir of Lafia (a Hausa-Fulani) should first seek the
permission of his ethnic (Eggon) paramount leader, (ThisDay, online, May 19, 2013) before
he would respond to the Emir’s summon over Ombatse’s activities, clearly reflects the
supremacy tussle in respect of the traditional institutions of the various ethnic groups in
Nasarawa. This underlines Eggon’s rejection of Hausa-Fulani ‘domination since the creation
of Nasarawa state in 1996.’ The deployment policy further nourishes the tension between the
Eggon and the state government. The crisis, therefore, has no puritanical objective but strictly
reflects domination and resistance politics.
Research question 2 - The Potential to deepen sectarianism and polarization among
Nigeria’s disparate social groups and threaten Nigeria’s efforts at democratic
consolidation
In 2011, two variables played important role in President Jonathan’s electoral success
over his challenger, General Muhammadu Buhari, of then Congress for Progressive Change
(CPC) in the non-Muslim Northern minority areas. One was the common Christian faith of
Jonathan and the non-Muslim Christian minorities. The other, perhaps, more important, was
Jonathan’s shared minority status with these groups, some of whom were neither Christians

nor Moslems. In the post- election office sharing politics, the protestation from other ethnic
groups in the state against the ceding of Nasarawa ‘s slot in the federal cabinet to the Eggon
seemed to have made little impression on then President Jonathan as the Eggon candidate,
Labaran Maku who manned the administration’s information portfolio also became a member
of Jonathan’s kitchen-cabinet. Maku’s appointment in 2014 as supervising minister of the
defense ministry
____________
*1. These issues are contained in the various reports on the crises in the state, including the
2002 Nasawara state Government memorandum explaining the nature and scope of the intercommunal conflicts in Nasarawa state submitted to the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into
the Inter-Communal Conflicts in Benue, Nasarawa, Plateau and Taraba states. Not only
underlined Jonathan’s confidence in him, but further underscored the profound divisiveness
Nigeria’s politics had turned towards the 2015 general elections.
Indeed towards the polls, the fault-lines of ethnicity and religion featured prominently
in the electioneering campaigns. With the general perception, especially among the Christians
that the Boko Haram insurgency was a Northern Muslim opposition to a Christian-Southerner
presidency, appointment of Maku, a Christian Northern minority to supervise the defence
portfolio hitherto superintended by a Hausa-Fulani Muslim resonated keenly among
Jonathan’s non-Muslim Northern and Southern supporters who rightly or wrongly perceived
it as a countervailing measure against Northern Muslim conspiracy. Thus, Nasarawa state in
itself presented a scenario that mixed politics, religion, and ethnicity; remained potentially
explosive, and raised the already charged political temperature in Nigeria. Without any real
safeguard within the Nasarawa political firmament to address the Eggon concerns as the 2015
general polls approached, tension heightened and fears of breakout of violence was genuine.
Eggon desperation for the Nasarawa governorship was quite obvious. Having thrown their
support in 2011 behind Al-Makura, who has an Eggon mother, with the understanding that he
would easily cede power to them after one term, the Eggon were sore over the
disappointment from their nephew. Although of the Gwandara stock, Al-Makura’s paternal
ancestry is Kano, a core Hausa Muslim city. Thus, rather than his maternal origin, AlMakura’s loyalty went to his Hausa-Muslim paternity.

The Hausa-Fulani Muslims have never hidden their determination to establish their
hegemony over Nasarawa from where they could spread both their political and religious
influence in the surrounding areas and even beyond. In fact, the conspiracy theory contends
that Nasarawa was carved out essentially for that purpose from the old Plateau state, where
the Hausa-Fulani Muslims had been feuding with native Christian population. Hence the
Muslim stranglehold on the political leadership of the state from inception. Al-Makura picked
the gubernatorial ticket of the All Progressive Congress (APC), thereby denying the Eggon
the much-anticipated support from him for 2015. Meanwhile, having failed to clinch his
People’s Democratic Party (PDP) ticket for the poll, Eggon candidate for the Nasarawa

governorship, Labaran Maku, dumped the PDP for the All Progressive Grand Alliance
(APGA). APGA as a political party was formed by the late Igbo folk’s hero, Chukwuemeka
Odimegwu Ojukwu essentially as Igbo political vehicle. Since its formation in 2003, APGA
has only made marginal political impression in the Igbo South-east region of Nigeria- a
predominantly Christian area. The Igbo outside of their area, reputedly are the second largest
after the indigenous population. Maku’s permutations were to rally the Igbo support while
also playing the Christian card, but poll’s results did not match his pre-election calculations.
Noteworthy is that as soon as the APC was registered as a political party in February
2013, by the Independent National Electoral Commission, (INEC), members from across
Nigeria converged in Nasarawa to celebrate the achievement. The import was not lost on the
discerning public. Until it joined forces with other political parties and associations to form
the APC, the CPC controlled only one state in Nigeria-Nasarawa. Although neither the entire
membership of the PDP nor CPC/APC is wholly Christian or Muslim, the CPC et al, now
APC, is perceived generally as a Muslim Hausa-Fulani party. The Convergence in the only
state under its control at the time was resoundingly symbolic: it projected the battle for
Nasarawa as fought on two fronts, namely, political, and ethno-religious. By the gathering,
the core Hausa-Fulani elements among the promoters of the APC hinted their resolve not to
concede the state to any other political party or folks. The group was also determined to
consolidate Muslim Hausa-Fulani control over the state. With the violence that erupted in
parts of the North after General Buhari loss to Jonathan in 2011, amidst Eggon’s Ombatse
mantra, fears of post-election violence in Nasarawa in 2015 was high whichever way the
victory went- either to the Hausa-Fulani camp or the Eggon. Nasarawa’s proximity to the
Nigeria’s capital also made the ethno-religious tension there more worrisome for Abuja
against the backdrop of the rising agitation by the natives of the Federal Capital Territory that
elective political offices in the capital city be their exclusive reserve. Indeed the appointment
of another Eggon, Patricia Akwashiki, a Christian into the vacant Information portfolio
towards the presidential election betrayed Jonathan’s seeming patronage of the Eggon.
Strategically, it was premised on its potential to rally the region’s mainly minority Christian
population for similar electoral outcomes as in 2011. Rightly or wrongly, the perception
among Nigeria’s non-Muslims generally of Jonathan’s main challenger then as in 2015,
General Buhari, as Hausa-Fulani Muslim candidate persisted. In the end, the PDP countermeasure against the APC failed to yield its anticipated outcome. The PDP garnered 273,460
votes (53.6 % of the votes) as against APC’s 236, 838, (46.4%) which however surpassed the
25 percent constitutional requirement for a presidential win. For the April 11, 2015
gubernatorial polls in Nasarawa, the Hausa-Fulani Muslim candidate, APC’s Al-Makura
routed Eggon’s APGA candidate, polling a total of 191, 463 votes as against Maku’s 114,
674 for the second position thus confirming Garba, et al theory of alliance by other ethnic
groups against the Eggon during the elections in spite of the latter’s numerical strength.
Invariably Eggon allegation of ethnic cleansing agenda against their stock and both local and
foreign mercenary involvement in the violence (Sunday Sun, online, June 2, 2013) add new
dimensions to the crisis and is capable of exacerbating the tension in the area. Amid
increasing violence by the Fulani militia in the state, Eggon charge against the Hausa-Fulani
of importing their kinsmen from neighbouring countries in the fights against them (Martha,

interview, 16 September 2013), is capable of deepening sectarianism and polarization in a
country where Fulani violence has become major a concern among other ethnic groups.
Research question 3 - likelihood of the tendencies in the Nasarawa politics nudging the
state into violence after the 2015 elections
As our research has shown, Nasarawa state is a contested political turf. Hitherto the
only state in the hands of the opposition CPC that merged with other political groupings to
form the APC now in power both in the state and the center, the Hausa-Fulani/APC factor in
the politics of the state combine with the Eggon crisis of marginalization to make the state
potentially explosive especially during elections. The violence which marked Nigeria’s 2011
general election in parts of Northern Nigeria, owed essentially to northern hegemonic forces’
rejection of southern Christian presidency. Against that backdrop, towards the 2015 elections,
there were genuine fears that with the Hausa-Fulani/APC resolve to retain the state clashing
with Eggon/Ombatse ‘It’s our turn’ mantra, the Nasarawa election was likely going to be
characterized by violence. But in order to deflate the built-up tension in the state, major
candidates in the gubernatorial contest were committed to a non-violence pact by
stakeholders, which entailed acceptance of the election results, without upsetting the peace.
Research question 4 - Viable solutions to address the potentially violate situation?
The only mechanism that approximates any discernable safeguard to the crisis of
domination in Nasarawa politics was the zoning arrangement which aimed at rotating the
governorship of the state among the three senatorial district of Nasarawa North, South and
South-west. The zoning arrangement ran smoothly from 1999, until 2015 when Al-Makura
insisted on another term rather than allow a candidate from Nasarawa North according to the
zoning formulae. The zoning had run in the following order: Nasarawa South West (19992007: Alhaji Abdullahi Adamu); Nasarawa South (2007-2015: Alhaji Aliyu Akwe Doma and
Alhaji Tanko Al-Makura). Had Al-Makura stepped down for a Nasarawa North candidate in
the 2015 elections, Al-Makura could have done only a term, a development that could have
maintained the zoning arrangement and doused the fear of domination. Towards 2015, signs
that Al-Makura would contest the governorship sparked off the Ombaste crisis –‘It’s our
time’- and fueled the tension in which Nasarawa was soaked during the elections.
Rather than the pre-election peace accord to forestall violent reactions to the election
results, the prevailing peace could be deduced from two sources, namely, former President
Jonathan’s conceding of defeat to his perennial challenger Buhari, which deflated the built-up
tension across the country and the presence of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in
Nigeria during the election. The ICC signaled its intention to prosecute actor(s)/player(s) that
incited violence prior to, during and after the elections, a development that obviously
restrained trouble-makers. After initially fearing outbreak of violence, thus postponing the
announcement of its decision on the election petition filed by Maku, against Al-Makura, the
Elections Tribunal finally re-affirmed Al-Makura’s victory. The anticipated violent reaction
to the development from the Eggon did not occur.

Discussion
The paper considered the Ombatse crisis vis-à-vis the 2015 general elections posing a
number of empirical and theoretical questions as listed in the foregoing paragraphs.
As we saw, the politics of Nasarawa state generally, including the 2015 gubernatorial
election outcome, on the one hand fitted into the themes of identity, hegemony, exclusionary
and resistant politics. On the theme of identity, Boas and Dunn’s postulation that the
phenomenon of autochthony is a recent development in African politics needs serious
interrogation. This paper proposes a direction. The politics of origin and belonging or ‘sonof-the-soil’ has existed in Africa as far back as the colonial period and deservedly occupied
the attention of many an African scholar. Nigerian scholar, Alubo (2008:1) for instance,
underlines identity politics as being at the root of the many cases in which violence is
perpetrated against Nigerians also by Nigerians “who are citizens of the Federal Republic but
not regarded and treated as citizens of particular spaces within Nigeria’s territory.” Identity
politics can thus manifest in the form of religion but more as ethnicity, the latter, which in its
more visceral forms is further broken down into “indigenes” (natives/son-of-the-soil) versus
“settlers” or “strangers” (ibid). Thus “[B]oth sets of identity refer to some relationship to the
land; not a return to the feudalism of yore but claims over who arrived in a particular location
first,” (ibid). For all intents and purposes, the indigene-settler feud underpins the perennial
bloodbath in the entire Middle-Belt and North-Central generally and the Plateau particularly
between the Berom, Afizere and others and the Hausa-Fulani. Within its identity politics
framework, the Ombatse crisis espouses Eggon outrage over their feeling of marginalization
and oppression by the Hausa-Fulani hegemony and subsequent resistance hinged on a claim
of earlier arrival in the Nasarawa area by the former over the latter.
On the whole, the outcome of the Nasarawa election reflected a number of themes in
our theoretical frameworks. For example, beyond identity, it mirrors the deep divisions
among the ethnic groups in the state as also the struggle for the control of the political
apparatus of the state between the Eggon majority group and the Muslim Hausa-Fulani,
which underpins the Ombatse crisis. Although the Eggon bloc vote had secured the electoral
victory for Al-Makura in 2011, in 2015 a political re-alignment between Al-Makura and other
ethnic groups, effectively neutralized Eggon’s numerical strength. Ironically those other
ethnic groups placed less premium on Al-Makura’s Hausa-Fulani Muslim religious
affiliation. Their support invariably mirrors the distrust of the Eggon. Nasarawa politics
obviously also falls within the framework of a polity characterized by the ‘struggle to
dominate the polity [and] … for gaining control of public resources and/or (making) an
exclusive claim to allocate state resources.’ It explains Maku’s desperation, which informed
his decision to dump the PDP for APGA. His refusal to accept the election result goes beyond
the primordial promptings of the Eggon folks. It is, specifically about the Eggon political
elite, losing out to the Hausa-Fulani counterpart. Were the ‘It’s our turn’ (Ombatse) mantra
not an elitist project, the Eggon commoner could have violently protested the electoral loss.
Maku’s loss at the election tribunal failed to inspire them to violence.

More so, although the non-eruption of violence in the post-election period may seem
to challenge our theory on the tendency by the different Nigerian social groups to use
violence for political ascendency in different historical circumstances, the pre-election
violence by the Ombatse cult yet supports the theory. Nevertheless, due attention needs be
paid to the role of the International Criminal Court, (ICC) in the 2015 elections in Nigeria.
The presence of ICC, arguably, served the deterrence function of discouraging the Eggon
political elite from inciting the people to violence. Accordingly, the effect of the ICC
presence during the 2015 election in Nigeria has proven the critical role, which the
international community using such important instrument as the ICC can play in the
consolidation process of emerging democracies. Mere sending of election observers and
monitors to developing democracies is clearly no longer enough. The ICC should, therefore,
make its presence in such polities a priority.
The voting did not however support Eggon pretensions to spiritual renaissance within
the traditional African religious framework. The non-Muslim ethnic groups that joined forces
with the Muslim Hausa-Fulani to defeat the Eggon candidate, Maku, thus making politicallyirrelevant, Eggon’s 47 percent of Nasarawa population, are either adherents of the traditional
African religion or Christians. This paper proposes that Nasarawa deserves more attention
both nationally and internationally than it currently gets, one, because of the involvement of
foreigner elements - fighters from neighboring African countries who came in support of
their Muslim Hausa-Fulani folks in Nasarawa amid growing insecurity in Nigeria symbolized
by the Boko Haram and Fulani militia violence. Two, because of the potentials of the
violence feeding into the existing ethno-religious tension in Northern Nigeria generally and
the North-Central in particular. With Nasarawa’s proximity to Abuja, amidst the restiveness
of the Abuja indigenous population over political offices in the Nigeria’s capital, latent
autochthony feelings in Abuja could spill to the surface. It is capable of threatening Nigeria’s
stability and her young democracy.

Conclusion and Recommendations
This paper has attempted to provide an insight into the tenuous relations between the
Eggon ethnic group and their Hausa-Fulani counterpart in Nasarawa state, North-central
Nigeria. The Eggon, as the study has shown, are a minority ethnic group in Nigeria, whereas
the Hausa-Fulani are a majority ethnic group. The Hausa-Fulani political forces, have always
trounced the Eggon in the struggle for the political leadership of the state. There is, therefore,
the likelihood of viewing the problem from the general framework of majority- minority
politics in Nigeria. But this could be misleading in that although in the context of the status of
ethnic groupings in Nigeria, the Eggon are a minority, they however constitute the largest
ethnic group in Nasarawa. The Hausa-Fulani have however been able to perpetuate the Eggon
political frustration by exploiting the mutual distrust between the Eggon and other nonHausa- Fulani ethnic groups, even when the Hausa-Fulani hegemony hardly benefits these
other groups. The paper therefore makes the following recommendations:

From indications, the safeguard, which Stefan speaks of in heterogeneous and divided
societies is clearly absent in Nasarawa politics. Amid the reality of truncating the zoning
arrangement, there is currently no discernable power-sharing framework that conveys a sense
of belonging not only to the Eggon but also the other social groups in Nasarawa.
Stakeholders, who should encompass political actors and other entities such as elders,
religious leaders, ethnic associations, etc should insist that the zoning arrangement be
respected. Within the senatorial districts, the zoning should further apply in order to
accommodate less vocal minor and marginalized groups. The truncated PDP zoning
arrangement, which stipulated rotation of the presidency between the North and South
provides a good template. It broadly aims at dousing the unnerving tension usually associated
with contestation of central power in Nigeria and to manage the tenuous social relations
among Nigeria’s disparate social groups. In the meantime, Al-Makura’s should run an
inclusive government that importantly accommodates the various social groups in the state.
While the sense of outrage over continuing eroding of the societal moral fabrics even
within the Christian-Muslim milieu is a fact and has in some instances elicited suggestions of
recourse to traditional templates with beliefs they could foster a more effective social control
mechanism and moral system, Ombatse should however shed its self-imposed puritan
mission. Ombatse can hardly camouflage its political agenda despite the spiritual revivalist
posturing. The group’s claim as “a spiritual body that has emerged to revive the well- known
and highly respected norms and traditions of the Eggon handed over by our ancestors…
[with] the sole aim …to cleanse our society of increasing ills just as any religious body in
Nigeria aims to achieve,” (Daily Trust, December 10, 2012, p. 58) can only excite a great
deal of dissonance in an acutely and religiously-contested environment as Nasarawa. The
state is not homogenous and attempt by the Eggon to impose its world-view on others
exposes an extremist tendency that could also elicit extreme reactions from other forces while
raising the scepter of religious-related violence in the North to which that region is prone. It
will add to the growing insecurity plaguing Nigeria.
The parallel between the events in Plateau state and the scenarios in Nasarawa also
deserve attention. Campbell and Harwood have noted that “[I]n Jos itself and in some
outlying villages, the violence has led to ethnic cleansing that recalls the Balkans. Formerly
mixed villages or Jos neighbourhood now consist of only single ethnic group,” (Daily Trust,
Friday, 19, July 2013, p. 3). Although the Eggon have defeated the Nasarawa government
deployment policy at the Supreme Court, the group’s perception of the policy as a
containment strategy should guide policy makers in the state to ensure that no attempts are
made in other subtle ways to outwit the law. No such policy should be directed against any
group as doing so could only worsen social relations. What is needed are policies that
enhance social cohesion.
Abuja should contemplate the Ombatse crisis beyond the death of security personnel
or the state as a mere object in the political permutations. Seeming State perception of the
problem as localized event with no direct threat to Abuja is faulty. Abuja should encourage
peaceful resolution of the crisis. Western attention that views the crisis from the lens of
festering sectarian violence in Nigeria is also mistaken. The Muslim vs ‘Other’ element in the

crisis could attract international mujahedeen, more so with the reported involvement of
foreigner elements in the violence.
Recommendations of the past commission of inquiries over past violence and crises in
the state should be implemented and those who suffered human and material loses in those
circumstances should be compensated in order to invoke a sense of justice.
One important lesson from the ICC intervention in the 2015 general elections in
Nigeria, is the critical role international agency like the ICC can play in divided societies as
Nasarawa and Nigeria. Nigerians and the civil society groups in the country should pressure
that the presence of the ICC during major elections be part of Nigeria’s electoral process.
Indeed hints by the African Union (AU) to commence trial of political offenders will be of
added value.

Suggestions for Future Research
From the foregoing analysis, it is obvious that despite the prevailing calm, the
Eggon/Hausa-Fulani political wrangling is far from over. The political situations in that state
should, therefore, be of continued interest not only to scholarly research but also to policy
makers, more so because of the proximity of the state to Abuja, Nigeria’s political capital.
Indeed the inability of the Eggon or any other ethnic group in Nasarawa state to assume the
governorship of the state rather than the political savvy of the Hausa-Fulani owes essentially
to the inability of other groups in the state to pool together their political resources to throw
off the Hausa-Fulani hegemonic yoke. We suggest that this should be of a subject of further
research from this study. What has sustained the Hausa-Fulani Muslim hegemony in
Nasarawa over and amidst mutually antagonistic ethno-religious groups despite the latter’s
collective numerical superiority? Since democracy is a game of numbers, why have these
other social groups been unable to exploit their aggregate superior numerical advantage to
end their collective political predicament? Why would the Eggon align politically with the
Hausa-Fulani Muslim elements in 2011 instead of rallying behind non-Hausa-Fulani political
forces in the state? Moreover, while the Nasarawa problem is expressed in political terms, it
is not limited merely to the struggle for the capture of the state political apparatus between
the Eggon and the Hausa-Fulani. Issues of religion and particularly autochthony also
underline the latent hostility that pervade social relations not only between the Eggon and
Hausa-Fulani, but also among the ethno-religious groups in Nasarawa. After fulfilling the
necessary conditions, why has Nasawara not yet assumed the dubious status of Jos Plateau,
also in the North-central, where indigene-settler rift often mutating into ethno-religious feud
has created perennial sectarian blood-letting? The potentials are still there. These should also
be of interest to researchers in the areas of peace, conflict and security.
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Appendix A
Interviewees:
1. Martha X – An Eggon woman and Aide of former President Goodluck Jonathan. She
lives in Abuja (interview, 16 September, 2013)
2. Hasuna Musa Zico Kigbu – (Chairman, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013)
3. Zabura Musa Akwanshiki,(Secretary, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013)
4. Abdullahi Usman (Member, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013)
5. Shuaibu Alkali (Member, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013)
6. Iliyasu Hassan Gyabo (Member, Ombatse) (interview, 20 September, 2013)
7. Chris Mamman- National President, Eggon Cultural Development Association,
(ECDA) (interview, 10 October 2013)
8. Manshop Peter Garba- Deputy Director and Researcher at the Institute for Peace and
Conflict Resolution, IPCR, Abuja. Although from near-by Kaduna state, Manshop
lives in Nasarawa among the various tribes in the state. He has good grasp of the
politics of the state (interview 18 September, 2013).
9. Hope Eweka- a non-Eggon who grew up in the Nasarawa Eggon. Formerly a
Researcher with the IPCR, she is now with the Nigerian Communications
Commission, NCC (interview, 18 September, 2013).
10. Rabo Bakare- of the Hausa/Fulani stock, Rambo formerly of the IPCR, now with the
Nasarawa State University, Keffi (interview, 12 October, 2013)
11. Dr. Abdullahi Liman- An Hausa, formerly of the University of Abuja, but now with
the Nasarawa State University, Keffi (interview, 21 September, 2013).
12. Nkiru Okoro, an Igbo, and trader, Nkiru was born in Agyaragu, Nasarawa State. She
was raised among the Gwandaras, Koros, Alagos, Agatus, Eggons, and other tribes in
Nasarawa state. She now lives in Masaka, near Abuja (interview, 12 October, 2013).
13. Abdul Tukur, a Gwandara petty trader from Lafia. He lives in Masaka, near Abuja
(interview, 12 October, 2013).
14. Asabe Musa, An Hausa unemployed political science graduate from Lafia. She
resides in Abuja (interview, 12 October, 2013).
15. Zakari Adamu- of the Alago ethnic group and an officer of the Nigerian Immigration
Services, (NIS). He lives in Abuja (interview, 20 September, 2013).

